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*Editors*



# ACADEMIC SUPER MARKETS



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ACADEMIC SUPERMARKETS

*A Critical Case Study of a Multiversity*

Philip G. Altbach, Robert S. Laufer, Sheila McVey, Editors

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## PREFACE



That higher education is in a period of stress and transition is news to few people. What is sometimes surprising, however, is the lack of serious and detailed analysis devoted to the challenges which higher education faces in the seventies. *Academic Supermarkets* is presented in an effort to provide this analysis by focusing on a single institution, the University of Wisconsin at Madison. Despite the case study approach of this volume, we feel that the analysis and data presented here have much relevance for other universities and particularly those large and prestigious institutions which have traditionally provided academic leadership. The problems of growth and stabilization, of academic politics, and of increasingly skeptical publics (students, legislatures, trustees, "public opinion") are by no means unique to Wisconsin.

We believe that the case study approach used in *Academic Supermarkets* can provide both the detailed data and the analysis necessary for a thorough understanding of the university in crisis. In the Prologue, we link the specific analysis of Wisconsin with broad aspects of higher education. In some respects, Wisconsin has been in the vanguard of academic turmoil—the rise of unionism among teaching assistants and the 1970 bombing of the Army Mathematics Research Center are examples of the extent of confrontation politics on campus. Yet, most of the problems of the University of Wisconsin are typical of those which higher education faces in a difficult period.

While *Academic Supermarkets* is not intended to provide a complete analysis of the University of Wisconsin, it does deal with the main elements of the academic equation: the power structure of the university—in this category, we include not only the administration of the institution but also such elements as the regents (trustees) and political forces—the faculty, and last (sometimes least as well) the students and teaching assistants. We feel that it is most important to focus attention on these elements and hope that other aspects of the university will be dealt with later. We have also included material on a number of critical areas of conflict in the university. Specifically, the chapters on research and on women in the university reflect this concern.

*Academic Supermarkets* is presented with a large dose of modesty, an equal measure of nerve, and several caveats. It is not an exposé of the University of Wisconsin, nor is it a full-scale analysis of an extremely complex institution. We have tried to present a forum for discussion, while not imposing any ideology upon our contributors, and in fairness it must be said that we disagree with the conclusions of a number of them. Some of the authors are critical, a few rather hostile, but all greatly concerned about the future of American higher education and about the University of Wisconsin in particular. We have tried to include discussions and analyses of most of the major issues that have faced the University of Wisconsin in the past few years and to make this volume as comprehensive as possible. We have been quite open concerning both the methodologies and orientations of our authors and have insisted only that all the contributors deal analytically with their subjects. Some of the chapters report fairly traditional research studies based on sociological or other data. Others are more speculative and reflective. A number are a combination of these and other methodologies. We hope this volume provides a beginning at institutional research, for clearly a great deal of research, analysis, and even speculation needs to be done concerning this great multiversity as well as other institutions of higher learning.

The origins of *Academic Supermarkets* date back to a seminar on comparative higher education offered by two of the editors (Altbach and Laufer) and in which the third editor (McVey) was a student in the fall of 1969. We were impressed at that time by the high quality of some of the research papers presented and by the almost complete lack of existing analysis of the University of Wisconsin. Students attempting to do research on various aspects of the Wisconsin situation found many obstacles, such as data which were unavailable from university authorities and the unwillingness of some officials and faculty members to fully discuss aspects of the university. Students also found an absence of background studies from which to work. We were also impressed by the pe-

culiar yet somehow typical situation of the University of Wisconsin. One of the most politically active campuses in the nation, Wisconsin has all the ingredients for crisis: a state university located a mile from the capitol building, a very large and diverse student body, a strong tradition of student political involvement, a substantial graduate school, and a faculty committed to graduate education and research but at the same time faced with a large number of fairly dissatisfied undergraduates and a cumbersome administrative structure. A number of factors, notably the rise of the Teaching Assistants Association as a force on the campus, the great budget crisis, and, most dramatically, the bombing of the Army Mathematics Research Center and its aftermath, make *Academic Supermarkets* a topical book.

A number of important changes are taking place at the University of Wisconsin which are not considered in detail here. Wisconsin, like other major (and minor) institutions of higher education in the United States, is faced with the dual problem of stabilizing or declining enrollments and a general financial squeeze. The implications of this financial crisis are being felt all over the campus in many ways—decreased financial aid for students, freezes on new faculty hiring, cutbacks in office workers, and so forth. In addition, the governor, in a surprise move, has suggested that the University of Wisconsin should be merged with the Wisconsin State University system (eight campuses throughout the state, mostly emphasizing undergraduate programs). If this merger takes place, as seems quite possible given the massive pressure for it despite opposition from the university, it will mean substantial changes in administrative structure. In short, the University of Wisconsin is now in the process of adjusting to the “recession” in higher education. These adjustments will be of major and long-term importance. Thus, while it is unlikely that the Madison campus will be completely transformed, it is in the process of change and the analyses in *Academic Supermarkets* will naturally be affected by these changes.

The lack of material on some key aspects is significant and deserves a note of explanation. One of the major problems of editing *Academic Supermarkets* was securing contributors who were both knowledgeable and willing to write. We found, again and again, that key participants in various events on the campus were, for various reasons, unwilling to set their thoughts on paper. Several individuals were clearly fearful of writing honestly about their experiences. The sanctions against speaking the truth or reporting controversial data must be ended if a full analysis of the crisis of higher education is to be made. It has been jokingly stated to one of the editors that the present book is an exercise in “publishing and perishing” for those involved. We shall see,



## Preface

Our main debt of thanks must go to our contributors. While they disagree, sometimes violently, among themselves, they all have the courage, interest, and analytical detachment to write coherently about an institution and an experience which has meant different things to different people.

November 1971  
Madison, Wisconsin  
Albany, New York

PHILIP G. ALTBACH  
ROBERT S. LAUFER  
SHEILA McVEY

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# ACADEMIC SUPERMARKETS

*A Critical Case Study  
of a Multiversity*





# PROLOGUE



## THE MULTIVERSITY IN CRISIS

*Philip G. Altbach, Robert S. Laufer, Sheila McVey*



The explosion which caused damage of more than a million dollars to several University of Wisconsin buildings and killed a postdoctoral fellow in physics on August 24, 1970, was the culmination of a series of crises on the Madison campus since 1966.<sup>1</sup> The death at Wisconsin was not the first casualty of the academic crisis that developed during the 1960s, but it was different from the tragedies at Berkeley, Kent State, and Jackson State in that the death of Robert Fassnacht was the result of a calculated risk by saboteurs rather than a death stemming from the heat of battle between police and protestors. Perhaps the bombing of the Army Mathematics Research Center (AMRC) made such an impact on the Madison campus, and on the student movement in general, because the incident illustrated the logic of confrontation politics carried to an extreme.

The student left, both at Wisconsin and nationally, was unable to accept this final step in the escalation of protest. Although it had been exposed to brutality and even death throughout the late sixties, the movement balked at the acceptance of terrorism and sabotage. As the national cry of outrage over Kent State and Jackson State indicated,

death was beyond the limits of confrontation politics. Although efforts were made by some of the most militant movement spokesmen to justify the "accidental" death of Fassnacht, the movement in general was unable to sustain the contradiction between the moral indignation they felt at the slaying of students at Kent and Jackson State and acceptance of death as a necessary risk of movement tactics, which acceptance of the AMRC bombing would have implied. The organizational paralysis of the student left following the AMRC events illustrates the movement's grappling with its conscience. Of course, the left did not completely reject terrorist tactics. A great deal of ambivalence was apparent in the general reaction—that the AMRC was destroyed was applauded by many, that it had been at the expense of a life was regretted by all, and it was abhorrent enough to contribute to the disintegration of unity within the movement.

It is probably not an exaggeration to say that the bombing, within the context of the student movement, could only have occurred at the type of institution that Clark Kerr has christened the "multiversity." The multiversity is characterized by its variety of interests and purposes; it is a series of communities and activities "held together by a common name, a common governing board, and related purposes." It is more a mechanism than an organic whole, "a series of processes producing a series of results—a mechanism held together by administrative rules and powered by money."<sup>2</sup> Although it was not his intention, Kerr has defined an institution that has lost its sense of community; in the absence of any overriding purpose or goal, the various elements that compose the multiversity engage in constant battle with each other.

The combination of a very large, cosmopolitan student population, a distinguished graduate school, and the tradition of radical student activism at many of the major universities has proved to be a volatile mixture. Furthermore, the growth of militant student activism in the mid-sixties was complicated by a general growth of conservatism in the broader society. Fiscal and enrollment crises in the latter part of the decade heightened tensions between militants and the campus establishment by clearly revealing financial priorities. This combination of factors proved to be more than the traditional means of university governance could handle effectively. The breakdown of university governance is widespread, and the multiversity—California, Columbia, Wisconsin—seems to be hardest hit. Although the attack on the AMRC at Wisconsin was certainly not a typical outcome of the breakdown of academic governance, it graphically symbolizes the dangerous possibilities of the failure of the university to function as a viable community.

The focus of this chapter is on the reasons why the elements of the university community—students, faculty, administration, and govern-

ing board—failed to deal effectively with the unprecedented challenges of the sixties. The general type of academic institution with which this paper deals is the multiversity; specific illustrations and analysis are confined to the University of Wisconsin.

Knowledge of the historical, academic, and social context of the multiversity is critical to understanding its current problems. Enormity of physical size is perhaps its most obvious characteristic. Wisconsin, with its multiple campuses, is typical; it is a large state university with four major campuses and seven two-year campuses, and it enrolls 61,546 students. The Madison campus, heart of the institution, has 31,132 students. A host of auxiliary services and research institutes are also part of the academic complex.

The multiversity attained its present size primarily during the years following World War II. The growth was a response to an economy based increasingly on technology; skilled manpower was needed in post-industrial America. The most practical way to secure a reliable source of expertise was through government sponsorship of research in the universities. Thus, the federal government became a major underwriter of higher education. The financial role of government in the multiversity is so great that the prestigious universities of the sixties were referred to as "federal grant universities."<sup>3</sup> The increase of federal spending for research and development provides a rough indication of the major universities' growth rate: In 1940, the universities spent approximately 31 million dollars for scientific research, of which the government contributed half. In 1962, the federal government spent more than a billion dollars for research and development in the universities, or seventy times the amount spent before the war. The total research and development budget nationally increased from 2.7 billion dollars in the late fifties to 16 billion dollars in 1969. With America's acceptance of the intellectual challenge offered by Russia's success with Sputnik, in 1958, the relationship between government and the university seemed to be confirmed, and the early sixties were marked by an extraordinary growth spurt.

Again, the growth of Wisconsin in the early sixties is representative of the rapid expansion in which the multiversity was engaged. During the presidency of Fred Harvey Harrington (1962–1970), growth was a watchword, and no one at the top levels of University of Wisconsin administration foresaw the period of retrenchment now evident throughout American higher education. President Harrington not only expanded enrollments, he also diversified the university into its present parts and added many new programs. Many of these programs were based on "soft" (grant) funds from the federal government and various foundations. With the general economic recession in the late sixties, a number



of these programs ran into financial difficulties as both government and foundations became increasingly reluctant to spend money. The only other major financial source available to a public university is, of course, the state. But the people of Wisconsin, as represented by the legislators, were reluctant to pick up the programs formerly funded by outside agencies and were also unwilling to authorize funds for new programs. In addition to the general economic situation, popular resentment against the university, caused mostly by militant student activism, contributed to the taxpayers' unwillingness to give the university the almost unlimited funds it had been able to command earlier in the decade. The present fiscal plights of such state systems as California, Illinois, and New York testify that the problem is general. Nor are financial difficulties confined to public universities. Eminent private multiversities are also experiencing monetary problems. Trustees appear increasingly unwilling to continue expansion, private donors are not giving to institutions with their usual generosity, and endowments are suffering from the recession. Columbia, Chicago, and even Harvard are cases in point.

Wisconsin is perhaps unique in that it is a large university with a substantial commitment to graduate education, but it is located in a relatively poor state. Wisconsin lacks the wealthy urban corporate and industrial centers found in most states with prestigious universities, such as Michigan and California. Thus, the university arouses in the people of the state a mixture of respect for its unquestioned quality and resentment for its high cost. When student agitation combined with a losing football team for several years, the resentment of the public took the upper hand. As one local legislator put it, "Wisconsin is a beer state and cannot afford a champagne university." That the president of the university earns more than the governor and that many professors earn more than senior state officials do not help matters. The university commands statewide attention. The main campus and the state capitol are only a mile apart at either end of State Street, a thoroughfare which has been the scene of many demonstrations and some "trashing" in the past few years. Indeed, the usual route for demonstrations is from the campus to the capitol, and on at least one occasion students invaded the legislative chambers and held lawmakers captive for several hours.

The national crisis of higher education has impinged directly on the University of Wisconsin. This is most dramatically seen in fiscal difficulties and leveling off of enrollments. During the regime of President Harrington, a successful effort was made to attract federal and other outside funds and to quickly expand both enrollments and new programs. Relatively little thought was given to the long-term effects of the sources of funds or of the new academic programs. At the same time, extremely

high out-of-state tuitions and the state legislature's quota on non-Wisconsin undergraduates has decreased their proportion in the student body. The leveling off of the birth rate has meant that in-state students have not filled the gap. In 1970 the Madison campus enrollment actually dropped for the first time since World War II, and the budget, which is in part linked to enrollments, suffered.

The financial and enrollment crisis is related to the political difficulties of the University of Wisconsin. President Harrington's effort to build a national university resulted in his neglect of the legislature and of important segments of Wisconsin public opinion. Had Harrington involved the legislature in the planning of the university during the early 1960s and in general treated individual legislators with more respect, the university might have fared better in a period of belt tightening.

The financial problems the multiversity currently faces, which Wisconsin in many ways typifies, are not the only costs of too rapid growth. Another cost of overexpansion, the disappearance of a sense of academic community, stems largely from the expansion and diversification of faculty and was an unforeseen outcome of the transformation of the university into the multiversity. Rapid growth created an enormous institution able to deal with the undergraduate student only on a level of bureaucratic impersonality, since the primary function of the multiversity had changed from teaching to research, from imparting knowledge to producing it. The changing role of America's major universities and the problems which the new orientation to research has brought are reflected in much of the literature on academic reform. Practically all major American universities, beginning in the late sixties, have engaged in major self-studies, although very few have implemented major changes. It is highly significant that almost all these documents have resulted not from the inherent interest of the faculty in reform, but from often frantic efforts by academic communities to deal with the challenges of student activism and disruption. Wisconsin has been typical of this trend and has dutifully appointed a committee to consider each of the crises which have occurred on campus. Several of these efforts have borne fruit, but most have been mere intellectual exercises.

While constantly stressing that the sources of many of the problems faced by the university are to be found in national forces and events, much of the reform literature accepts the breakdown of the intellectual community and the failure of academic governance as a starting point. In other words, although the crises faced by higher education are entwined with forces external to it, the multiversity must also find some means of coping with its unique internal crisis of governance. The solutions offered by the reform literature vary—decentralization, various

forms of general education, residential colleges within the multiversity, greater autonomy and freedom for the student in planning his education—*but all represent an attempt to correct an institution which has grown so vast, become so impersonal, so highly administered and bureaucratized, so enmeshed in the national economy, that the sense of community necessary to traditional academic governance has been destroyed.*

In order to understand the crisis of governance faced by the university, it is necessary to examine the elements of the academic equation within the institution—students, faculty, administration, and regents—that have been critical both to the crisis and to the response which the institution has made. In our attempt to illustrate the problems generally faced by the multiversity, we will rely primarily on our experience and observation at the University of Wisconsin.

Students at Madison have a long tradition of activism and social involvement.<sup>4</sup> The Progressive movement in the early years of the twentieth century relied on student support, and many of its political conventions were held on campus. Madison was a center of student activism in the 1930s and was one of the few bastions of student radicalism during the apathetic 1950s. The student movement, however, has undergone substantial changes since the middle sixties. Although students are very much concerned with broad social issues, especially the war in Vietnam, they are increasingly dissatisfied with the academic environment of the Madison campus.<sup>5</sup> Many undergraduate students have been concerned about large classes, about what they perceive as overly rigid course and other requirements, and, perhaps more importantly, about a university administration which they feel is unresponsive. Various campus surveys indicate that the proportion of dissatisfied students has increased dramatically. For example, distrust of the university administration has increased during the various crises on campus.<sup>6</sup>

The growth of a counter-culture, with its emphasis on rock music and drugs and its general alienation from many of the values of the existing society, has intensified the intellectual and social distance between students and the university. The organized student left, after a short period of attempting to organize around issues of university reform in 1968, has withdrawn from those efforts except for attacks on the institution for its complicity with the Vietnam war or other involvement with the military-industrial complex. Even the Wisconsin Student Association, the elected student government, has moved away from concern with academic reform, largely as a response to the meager results it felt it had achieved through previous involvement in student-faculty committees on various issues. This general dissatisfaction, although not the direct cause of any demonstrations, underlies much student militancy.

## The Multiversity in Crisis

Although it is certainly true that the Madison faculty and administration have not given up any of their basic power to students, since the late sixties students—usually token students—have been placed on virtually all the many Madison campus committees. In addition, the university has moved slowly to liberalize regulations concerning dormitories and other aspects of nonacademic life and has, despite hesitation from some Regents and many alumni, moved away from the idea of *in loco parentis*. Undergraduates, however, generally have not been impressed with this gradual involvement and liberalization. A mass exodus from university-owned dormitories, which has caused something of a fiscal crisis for their management, is an indication of the growing detachment of many students from the whole institutional environment. It is significant that students have, by and large, not been impressed with the fairly modest curricular changes that have been recently made in the College of Letters and Science. In the 1970-1971 academic year, for example, language requirements for most undergraduate degrees were modified, the pass-fail system was extended, and the grading system was somewhat changed. The overwhelming response from articulate students was that these changes were mere tokenism. Even those relatively moderate students who served on the various curriculum committees which proposed more sweeping changes were dissatisfied with the final outcome.

It is always true, of course, that the majority of students are fairly happy with their academic experience and cause few problems for the authorities. However, available studies, combined with general observation, indicate that the minority of increasingly articulate dissatisfied students is growing rapidly. And on a campus of 31,000 students even a small percentage of dissatisfied students can organize a significant demonstration. The constituency for militant activism during times of crisis in Madison is quite large, especially when police or the National Guard are brought on campus or the administration is perceived by many students to have acted badly. Rallies of close to ten thousand young people are not uncommon during crises, and at least three hundred militant students are constantly active in and around the campus. In addition, Madison has become a center for a large nonstudent youth community of university dropouts and others who come to the area. This community supports a thriving counter-culture in and around the Mifflin Street area which has been the scene of many confrontations with police. The youth culture reflects on the image of the university and is a ready recruiting ground for participants in all types of militant demonstrations.

Graduate students, often ignored in discussions of student activism, have been a particularly important element in crises at the University of Wisconsin.<sup>7</sup> Traditionally, graduate students have been deeply involved



in their academic pursuits and socialized to their roles as future professors. Even radical graduate students, and the Madison campus has been a center for such students for several decades, have maintained a commitment to the university and to academic careers. This situation has changed dramatically, and as a result graduate students have become quite important in the crisis at the University of Wisconsin.

The changing self-perception and growing activism of graduate students have a number of causes. Certainly, the overproduction of Ph.D.s which became evident in 1970 in many fields and the resulting difficulty experienced by many new Ph.D.s in finding employment led to dissatisfaction and to decreasing professional commitment. It must be remembered that until the end of the sixties graduates of universities like Wisconsin were not only assured of jobs, but could expect initial appointments at fairly prestigious universities. Now they are lucky to find any employment at all in some fields. The counter-culture has also encroached upon graduate student ranks, and there has been growing rejection of the entire academic career pattern. Radical graduate students, who only a few years ago felt that major commitment was to conduct "radical" research, increasingly reject research altogether; they no longer wish to associate with prestigious universities but prefer working-class students in junior and community colleges. And, of course, the broad political crisis in the country that affects undergraduates also has implications for graduate students. All these factors have produced a new generation of graduate students—one which many professors find it difficult to understand or to work with.

Graduate students have been active in a number of departments—sociology, history, English, mathematics, and several others in the College of Letters and Sciences—in efforts to institute reforms such as changes in preliminary examinations and involvement of students in departmental affairs. These efforts have been largely unsuccessful, although a few departments have made modest changes. In most departments, with the partial exceptions of those cited above, reform efforts have been sporadic, and both undergraduate and graduate students have been unwilling to spend time on committees and in other undramatic work needed to formulate and implement change. In addition, the faculty, for the most part, has been fairly intransigent, and many personal animosities have developed, often to the disadvantage of the graduate students, who depend on faculty members for academic progress and ultimately for their degrees.

The most important manifestation of graduate student discontent is the Teaching Assistants Association.<sup>8</sup> The TAA was established in 1966 by a small group of about 50 of the more than 1,600 graduate students

who are employed by the university as teaching assistants, usually in large undergraduate courses. It has been estimated that 68 per cent of freshman and sophomore undergraduate teaching is done by teaching assistants.<sup>9</sup> The TAA grew because of many teaching assistants' discontent over working conditions, lack of involvement in course planning, poor remuneration, and threats by the state legislature to cut out-of-state graduate enrollment and to eliminate the out-of-state tuition scholarships which were automatically granted to assistants. These threats, although never carried out, provided impetus for the TAA, and by February 1969 the TAA claimed a majority of teaching assistants as members and demanded to engage in collective bargaining with the university.

In a still controversial decision, Madison campus Chancellor H. Edwin Young agreed to bargain with the TAA over a contract, and negotiations began in the fall of 1969. The talks continued for four months, and the TAA, feeling that the administration was uninterested in reaching a settlement and also fearing the loss of many members because of its failure to produce results, first suspended negotiations and then called a strike. This strike, which took place in March of 1970, shortly before the Cambodia and Kent State crisis on campus, effectively halted most teaching in the humanities and social sciences for more than a week and affected other parts of the campus as well. Then student support for the strike dwindled, and many undergraduates who had stayed out of classes returned. At the same time, many teaching assistants who were on strike simply could not afford an extended period with no income. The TAA was forced to agree to basically the prestrike contract offer of the university. However, the contract was still unprecedented in Wisconsin history. The TAA gained a substantial measure of job security for its members and also a delineation of working conditions, class size, and other matters. The university made a commitment to joint educational planning by teaching assistants, students, and faculty, but did not spell out mechanisms for implementation. While not meeting the original demands of the TAA, the settlement provided teaching assistants with more power and security than they had previously had.

The TAA has exhibited a combination of the traditional trade union approach to bread and butter issues and more militant concern for social and academic reform. Much of the leadership of the TAA is radical, although the rank and file is probably more interested in the specific gains which the association has won. For the first time, graduate students have been willing to risk the enmity of senior faculty in order to build a union, thus indicating that the commitment to an academic career and to the traditional subservient role of the graduate student is not as widespread as it once was. One result of the existence of the TAA has been

in their academic pursuits and socialized to their roles as future professors. Even radical graduate students, and the Madison campus has been a center for such students for several decades, have maintained a commitment to the university and to academic careers. This situation has changed dramatically, and as a result graduate students have become quite important in the crisis at the University of Wisconsin.

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The most important manifestation of graduate student discontent is the Teaching Assistants Association.<sup>8</sup> The TAA was established in 1966 by a small group of about 50 of the more than 1,600 graduate students

who are employed by the university as teaching assistants, usually in large undergraduate courses. It has been estimated that 68 per cent of freshman and sophomore undergraduate teaching is done by teaching assistants.<sup>9</sup> The TAA grew because of many teaching assistants' discontent over working conditions, lack of involvement in course planning, poor remuneration, and threats by the state legislature to cut out-of-state graduate enrollment and to eliminate the out-of-state tuition scholarships which were automatically granted to assistants. These threats, although never carried out, provided impetus for the TAA, and by February 1969 the TAA claimed a majority of teaching assistants as members and demanded to engage in collective bargaining with the university.

In a still controversial decision, Madison campus Chancellor H. Edwin Young agreed to bargain with the TAA over a contract, and negotiations began in the fall of 1969. The talks continued for four months, and the TAA, feeling that the administration was uninterested in reaching a settlement and also fearing the loss of many members because of its failure to produce results, first suspended negotiations and then called a strike. This strike, which took place in March of 1970, shortly before the Cambodia and Kent State crisis on campus, effectively halted most teaching in the humanities and social sciences for more than a week and affected other parts of the campus as well. Then student support for the strike dwindled, and many undergraduates who had stayed out of classes returned. At the same time, many teaching assistants who were on strike simply could not afford an extended period with no income. The TAA was forced to agree to basically the prestrike contract offer of the university. However, the contract was still unprecedented in Wisconsin history. The TAA gained a substantial measure of job security for its members and also a delineation of working conditions, class size, and other matters. The university made a commitment to joint educational planning by teaching assistants, students, and faculty, but did not spell out mechanisms for implementation. While not meeting the original demands of the TAA, the settlement provided teaching assistants with more power and security than they had previously had.

The TAA has exhibited a combination of the traditional trade union approach to bread and butter issues and more militant concern for social and academic reform. Much of the leadership of the TAA is radical, although the rank and file is probably more interested in the specific gains which the association has won. For the first time, graduate students have been willing to risk the enmity of senior faculty in order to build a union, thus indicating that the commitment to an academic career and to the traditional subservient role of the graduate student is not as widespread as it once was. One result of the existence of the TAA has been



a marked deterioration in some departments of relations between graduate students and faculty, and a number of departments are talking seriously of abolishing the teaching assistant system completely. In the summer of 1971, negotiations for a new contract between the Madison campus administration and the TAA took place. With a widespread feeling among faculty against the TAA, due especially to the large number of grievances which the TAA has filed against many departments, and an apparent drop in support for the TAA among some teaching assistants, the outcome of these negotiations is very much in doubt.

These comments indicate that a change has occurred in the student population at the University of Wisconsin, or at least among major segments of that population. Increasing alienation from the academic system and perhaps from the entire employment structure of the society are evident. The pressure of national and international affairs, and especially of the Indochina war, has radicalized many students. Finally, the impact of the counter-culture, as yet generally unanalyzed, has made itself felt in increased alienation. It is clear that not only cosmopolitan students from New York and Chicago, long the scapegoats for campus unrest at Madison, but young people from urban and rural middle-class Wisconsin families are participating in the student movement and are part of the counter-culture in increasingly large numbers.<sup>10</sup>

The faculty is the second key element in Wisconsin's crisis, and, perhaps more than any other element of the university, it has been deeply affected by the events of the crisis years. As one of the major universities in the United States, the Madison campus has traditionally attracted a research-oriented, articulate, and generally competent faculty. It has a first-rate faculty despite comparatively poor salaries (Wisconsin ranks tenth in the Big Ten in salaries and one hundred and fifty-fourth among American universities). The excellence of Wisconsin's faculty is related to what is generally known as the "Wisconsin Idea." This ethos combines the notion of academic autonomy for departments and for individual faculty members with a very large measure of faculty self-government under the very broad aegis of the regents. Faculty power in institutional decision-making may seem to be a poor substitute for monetary reward, but research on faculty militancy consistently shows that professors at major universities are more concerned with wielding effective power within the institution than with attaining higher salaries, although certainly the professoriate is not so altruistic as to reject the latter goal. In point of fact, faculty control over institutional decision-making seems harder to attain than higher salaries. The American Association for Higher Education, in what is probably the most comprehensive survey of various forms of academic governance, estimates that only 25 per cent of

institutions of higher education are governed by a system of shared authority between faculty and administration; most of the remaining 75 per cent are either firmly guided or completely dominated by their administrations. Only a few campuses are marked by faculty dominance on a broad range of issues.<sup>11</sup> Thus, Wisconsin's tradition of academic self-governance has been an invaluable aid in securing an excellent faculty in the face of below average remuneration.

Another facet of the Wisconsin Idea stresses commitment to making the university relevant to all elements of the state's population. The Wisconsin Idea dates to the Progressive Era, when the university was intimately involved with the state government and built its reputation for both relevance and scholarly achievement. Hofstadter sees this period at Wisconsin as a foreshadowing of the relationship between the federal government and the academy that became so characteristic of the multiversity in the fifties and sixties.<sup>12</sup> However, in the mid-twentieth century, the scope of the relationship between government and higher education has expanded to a national partnership encompassing all levels of government and permeating all major universities.

Beginning in the late sixties, the Wisconsin Idea has come under major attack, and neither faculty nor administration has been able to restore the balance in terms of morale, power, prestige or, importantly, salaries. The faculty has lost a good deal of its internal autonomy to the regents and, to a degree, to the administration. Its prestige in the state has been substantially diminished, in part because of its "inability" to deal with student radicals. And in a period of financial stringency, highly paid professors who, according to the press and some legislators, spend little time teaching, are naturally the subject of controversy.

Academic governance at Wisconsin underwent substantial change in the sixties, and this has contributed to some degree to the demoralization of the faculty. The faculty more than doubled during the presidency of Fred Harvey Harrington, and academic programs on the Madison campus burgeoned with the addition of many institutes, centers, and other programs. Younger academics, particularly in the social sciences and humanities, who did not share many of the values of their senior colleagues, came into the system. Traditional means of faculty governance came under attack from both internal and external sources. Regents attacked the faculty for not being harsh enough to student protestors and for failing to maintain order on the campus, while students criticized the faculty for its conservatism.

The basis of academic governance at Wisconsin has traditionally rested in the senior faculty, who controlled the important University Committee, the nine-man executive committee which is the voice of the

faculty to the administration and to other audiences as well. The University Committee, aided by a complex array of other committees dominated by the senior faculty, governed the Madison campus with substantial autonomy and little challenge for decades. In the past, the highest faculty governing body was the entire Madison campus faculty. The monthly faculty meetings were usually attended by a small group of faculty who were especially concerned with specific questions on the agenda or who were members of various committees. This situation changed as the faculty became more heterogeneous and as dramatic crises meant the calling of faculty meetings to which more than a thousand came. These factors led to the establishment, in 1970, of the two-hundred-member Faculty Senate which now operates in place of the all-campus faculty meetings. Although the Senate has had the effect of strengthening the power of the senior faculty and especially of the University Committee, which sets the agenda and has a major voice in the conduct of meetings, most of the various factions on the faculty, from radicals to extreme conservatives, are represented on the senate.

The politics and structure of the Madison campus faculty do not differ greatly from those at other major academic institutions. Until the mid 1950s, the faculty constituted a fairly close community with strong loyalty to the institution. The senior faculty, and particularly those professors who had chosen to involve themselves in local campus affairs, dominated the faculty through the University Committee. In a cosmopolitan research-oriented university, the ruling elements of the faculty were more locally-oriented and perhaps less interested in research and in nationally visible scholarship.<sup>13</sup> Junior faculty either used the university as a steppingstone to other jobs or were willing to leave the day-to-day decision-making to their senior colleagues. The regents were content to leave the actual running of the campus to the faculty and its complicated committee structure. A community of interest existed between the research-minded faculty, who were willing to leave the governance of the institution to others, and those who actually did the decision-making.

The situation on campus has changed and the faculty no longer constitutes a homogeneous community. Its response to crisis has generally been without coherent direction and has, in fact, contributed to the institution's malaise. In a period marked by overproduction of doctorates, by student discontent, and by demands for better undergraduate teaching, the traditional research orientation of the Madison faculty has come under attack. The faculty, and especially its senior members, have not been willing to relinquish any of the very real power that professors have over the educational process and over their own professional lives. As was indicated by a national survey of faculty sponsored by the Carnegie Com-

mission, faculty members are notably conservative on issues of university reform and change, with senior faculty holding the most conservative positions.<sup>14</sup> The Wisconsin experience supports these national findings. The usual faculty response to crisis is to appoint a committee to study the matter and, usually, do little to change the status quo. This response is increasingly rejected by both students and Regents, who demand solutions that can be implemented. The faculty, in part with greater knowledge of the intricacies of academic governance and a commitment to Wisconsin's traditional values, and in part as a result of its own vested interests, has refrained from suggesting major changes.

The politics of the Madison campus faculty are significant and, in a sense, somewhat surprising. Despite the existence of a few defined factions within the faculty, there has been little of the bitter infighting or protracted factionalism among the faculty that has been evident at Berkeley or to some extent at Harvard. Despite the fears of some regents and a few administrators, the organized faculty left, grouped around the very small and generally ineffective New University Conference chapter, has little strength and almost no direction. The United Faculty, a union with a membership of about two hundred which is loosely affiliated with the American Federation of Teachers, has experienced some growth, but is not a force on campus. An ad hoc group of liberal faculty, largely drawn from the social science and humanities departments, comes together for common action during crises but has little in common at other times. The mainstream of the faculty is mildly liberal in politics but traditional on matters of academic governance. With relatively few professors actually keeping abreast of the complex and often uninteresting issues involved in campus governance, a small group of senior professors, who are loyal to the institution and have generally been on campus for many years, effectively control the faculty. Their power is based on the support they have from the largely apathetic and generally conservative faculty in such schools as engineering and agriculture and on their involvement in the committee structure.

Despite the lack of political activism among the faculty, there is some discontent. Many junior faculty are unhappy with their lack of power in policy-making and with the general direction of the institution. Worsening conditions on campus, in terms of salaries, teaching conditions, self-image, and autonomy, have demoralized many faculty, and there has been a substantial exodus from a number of departments, notably in the College of Letters and Sciences. Unlike Berkeley, Wisconsin does not seem to have a great deal of holding power in periods of stress.

For the most part, the Madison campus administration, the third factor in the academic equation, represents and reflects the interests of



the senior faculty. Most administrators have been Wisconsin faculty members or at least have taken their academic training at Wisconsin. They are usually selected by committees dominated by senior faculty members. For the most part, Wisconsin administrators are professors who have chosen to follow the local academic career pattern and who have given up scholarly productivity and have devoted themselves to academic administration. While styles of administration differ, the close advisors or immediate staff of the chancellor are senior faculty, and very few younger individuals are involved in the top level of academic administration.

The administration, in contrast to the faculty, is concerned to a substantial extent with the maintenance of the University of Wisconsin as an institution. Many administrators, particularly in the crisis-ridden period since 1965, have felt that they are protecting the institution from the ravages of Wisconsin's legislators. This feeling has also been expressed on many occasions by the Board of Regents, who are in closest touch with the opinions of legislators and perhaps also with public opinion. The administration also seems to feel that it is protecting the faculty and, in a sense, the students from harsh treatment by state authorities. This state of mind, while no doubt somewhat justified, has led the top levels of leadership in the university to increasingly conservative public statements and policies in an effort to placate public opinion. Administrative policy seeks to assure the public that the university will remain calm or at least that disruption will be dealt with effectively.

On the Madison campus, the profusion of schools, colleges, programs, and other agencies makes efficient administration difficult, and the implementation of reform is next to impossible because of the complicated decision-making structure and often overlapping jurisdictions. And at the bottom of the system are, of course, the academic departments. The departments have substantial autonomy and tend to be organizationally conservative and quite jealous of their own prerogatives. Reform plans often bog down when they reach the departmental structure.<sup>15</sup>

The Madison campus administration has been under tremendous pressure in recent years and has a difficult time simply responding to recurring crises. Between 1967 and 1970, student agitation and its implications occupied a major portion of the time of academic administrators. In the 1970-1971 academic year, severe budget cuts and an impending merger of the University of Wisconsin and the Wisconsin State University system were imposed on the administration by the state government. In its internal functioning, the administration is severely limited by the immensely complicated system of faculty governance and by the innate conservatism of the senior faculty and of most of the departments. The university is in the unenviable position of being unable to implement change

from the top because of internal governance while at the same time no longer having funds to ensure expansion and improvement from the bottom. Thus, administrators live from crisis to crisis with little scope for creativity and growing frustration.<sup>16</sup>

Given these constraints, it is not surprising that the administration has not responded in a very creative manner to any of the crises which it has faced since 1965. Internal and external pressures, in addition to the general establishment orientation of the administration which is ensured by their background and recruitment methods, has meant that crises have been met by short-term compromises, or, more often, by the use of outside force. The general pressures of Madison campus academic administration, the continual balancing of political forces, and the inability to make much headway on educational improvement or reform have caused many to resign. But the nature of decision-making and the general orientation of the senior faculty who have taken administrative posts has remained fairly constant.

The Board of Regents is the fourth factor on campus. It consists of nine individuals appointed by the governor for nine-year terms, plus the superintendent of public instruction.<sup>17</sup> As a result of the appointments of Governor Warren Knowles, a Republican who served during most of the 1960s, the board has developed strong conservative majorities. The composition of the Board of Regents, as is pointed out in Chapter Four, reflects a cross section of the Wisconsin establishment. Most Regents are college-trained, usually at the University of Wisconsin; almost all are Wisconsin-born and have strong ties to the state.<sup>18</sup>

The board members have taken an increasingly activist role.<sup>19</sup> Until the major disruptions of the mid-1960s, the Regents traditionally (with some exceptions during earlier periods of the university's history, such as in the late 1920s) left direct policy-making and administration to the faculty and its administrative officers. But because the faculty has been perceived to have failed to maintain order on campus, the Regents have begun to intervene directly in academic affairs.

According to law, the Regents have final authority over the university and its staff and are empowered to use this authority in almost any way they wish. At Regent initiative, a committee to reexamine the tenure system was established in 1971. The Regents have used study committees on such topics as drugs, student and faculty discipline, buildings, and other subjects to stress their authority and initiative. When these study committees have arrived at conclusions different from those of the faculty, in most cases the Regent opinion has prevailed. This increased involvement and broadened jurisdiction are looked upon with great fear and mistrust by the faculty and administration, which are used to acting

autonomously and are quite unhappy with the undebatable loss of power. In 1970 the Regents involved themselves more deeply in faculty affairs by refusing to grant a salary increase to sociology professor Maurice Zeitlin because of their displeasure with his controversial public statements and his antiwar activities. Only after a major campaign by the faculty were the Regents forced to back down on this issue, perhaps indicating that a united stance by the faculty still influences those with formal power in the university. The point, however, was made and it is likely that faculty will be more careful in their statements in order to avoid the ire of the Regents. As the Regents are quite sensitive to the political climate in the state, it is possible that the Republican Regents will moderate their positions in deference to a liberal Democratic governor and to the Democrat-controlled state assembly.

President Harrington did not involve the Regents in his administration, except on the very broadest issues, and as a result they seemed to have been somewhat unaware of some of the new directions in which the university was moving. The Madison campus administration has traditionally attempted, with a good deal of success, to obscure its work so that outside forces could not effectively control the situation. The Regents, the Coordinating Council on Higher Education—a state agency responsible for the allocation of funds to the various public universities and colleges—and the legislature itself have all been somewhat unclear about the nature of the university budget and other aspects of its functioning. And as outside sources of funding disappear and the university must turn increasingly to the state, it is not surprising that both the Regents and state authorities should wish for greater accountability and control over the university.

In order to understand the crisis of academic governance, it is necessary to view the way in which the various components of the multiversity interact. Only by looking at the history of student protest and the institution's response to it can we understand the dynamics of the series of events that culminated in the bombing of AMRC. The question we must ask is why the university community, and especially the students, accepted violence as a legitimate means of conflict resolution. Since violence is a product of a breakdown of legitimate authority, an examination of the means of university governance is the proper beginning.

The legitimacy of academic governance has traditionally been sustained by the myth of the university as a community of scholars. As long as the assumptions on which the myth rested remained unquestioned, authority went unchallenged. The existence of the myth was supported by subscription on the part of the university members to an idea of a diverse community harmoniously united in the pursuit of truth. As long

as truth went without need of definition, the consensus upon which the myth depended held. But the pressing social problems of the sixties demanded a clearer definition of ends, and that attempt at definition shattered the myth by revealing the university as an institution composed of a multitude of competing interest groups, each seeking its own end.

As long as a lack of crisis allowed the governing structure to be minimally responsive to the various groups in the community, an uneasy consensus was maintained. However, university government responded to crisis by taking a highly partisan position, and through this stance it showed dissident students and faculty their real impotence. The dissident groups responded by using the tactics they had learned from the struggles of other disenfranchised groups whom they had supported during the sixties—confrontation. In turn, confrontation challenged the credibility of the university government's claim to legitimate authority; in the absence of credibility, the university resorted to coercion. The frequent use of force, which often resulted in violence, completed the polarization of the community.

The administration's decision to use external agencies of social control was not a simple response to student dissent. The decision was the result of the administration's definition of the university when student protest demanded a clear statement of purpose. This definition of the function of the university was to a great extent dictated by the symbiotic relationship that had developed between the university and the larger society in the years following World War II. Institutional relationships between the university and the national government developed in the form of contract research, special institutes, and foundation grants. The implications of this relationship went unquestioned until the Vietnam war turned a significant sector of the university community against the government's foreign policy. When the government failed to respond to early protest against the war, critical students and faculty began to search for the reasons for the government's recalcitrance. Reexamination of government policy in general led many to the conclusion that our domestic economic and political policy was a reflection of foreign policy, that the whole of our society shared in responsibility for the war. The community closest at hand to a large number of critics was the university, and the contribution of the university to the war effort was easily documented by examination of the funding sources for various research enterprises. When students and their supporters demanded that the university sever its connections with governmental and industrial agencies directly linked to the war, the administration refused. In its attempts to justify and defend existing arrangements, the administration revealed its partisan position and began the erosion of its legitimate claim to authority. The adumance



of its position led eventually to the use of force, and open coercion destroyed the myth of the community of scholars which, by definition, commands obedience only through rational persuasion.

The administration's decision to use force to maintain order was thus not fully autonomous; it was partly the product of the university's involvement with and dependence on national funds and local government. Also, a significant portion of the faculty favored the use of swift harsh punishment for dissidents. Thus, the administration was pressured by both its external and internal constituencies to use force, yet it was not openly compelled to do so; it had a choice. Admittedly, the choice to seek means other than the use of force would have entailed considerable risks for the survival of the administration, yet there was a possibility of success. Certainly the lesson provided by Berkeley should have warned that employing force was perhaps as dangerous to the long-term stability of the campus as was a search for another means of resolving conflict. If the police had not been utilized at an early stage, thus providing the protestors with a moral basis for their claims that university government was unjust and therefore illegitimate, the administration might have prevented the factionalization of the campus, the profound alienation of students from faculty and administration, of faculty from fellow faculty. There was an alternative to violence, although at the time it was apparently not seen. Undoubtedly, the reason the element of choice was not perceived stemmed from the fact that a choice to abstain from the use of force would have meant a radical reorganization of the university.

Madison's crisis began two years after the Berkeley student revolt. The first disruptive protest took place in 1967 and was concerned with the Vietnam war. The focus was two-fold: opposition to the university's cooperation with the selective service system and opposition to job recruiting by the Dow Chemical Company, manufacturers of napalm. When students occupied a part of the engineering campus in an effort to prevent Dow interviews, the police were called and a number of students were arrested, although no physical confrontation took place and little damage was done. In a move which effectively defused a volatile situation, Chancellor Robben Fleming paid the bail of the arrested students with a personal check for more than a thousand dollars. His action was praised by the faculty and moderate students, but he set several dangerous precedents.

First, he called the police, and a number of arrests occurred. The arrests were peaceful, but the use of police marked the first intervention of an outside agency in campus matters, although Fleming effectively muted the issue of police on campus by bailing out the arrested students.

Second, although his action prevented great hostility between students and administration from developing, he had resolved the crisis by personal imagination, rather than facing the more difficult problem of establishing institutional mechanisms for resolving conflict. Third, he antagonized members of the Board of Regents and of the legislature as well as part of the population of the state by his dramatic gesture, which many perceived as open support of student radicals. Fourth, the faculty, in response to the issue of war-related recruiters on campus, made a policy decision, in a meeting of the whole, to keep the university open to recruiters.

The first large-scale disruption of academic life that involved large numbers of police and the arrest of substantial numbers of students on campus took place in October of 1967, again over the issue of job interviews by the Dow Chemical Company.<sup>20</sup> Fleming had resigned in order to assume the presidency of the University of Michigan and the new chancellor, William Sewell, a liberal sociologist, was confronted with a demonstration more militant than that of the preceding year. In response to the continued escalation of the Vietnam war and to the university's continued, although indirect, support of it, roughly three hundred students had decided to block the passageway in the Commerce Building which led Dow Chemical Company's recruiters to their temporary offices. Thus, the administration was forced to make a decision. Allowing the city police to clear the building meant risking the possibility of violence, police brutality, and polarization of the campus. Allowing the students to remain in the building meant antagonizing the Regents, the legislature, and a considerable segment of the faculty.

Sewell, a former member of the University Committee, was committed to the decision-making system of the university and intimate with those faculty members who controlled the system of faculty self-governance. His commitments to the existing organizational structure prevented him from attempting the difficult search for an alternative. In permitting the use of city police, he gambled that violence could somehow be avoided, and that if violence did in fact occur only the student community would be alienated. In other words, he expected the faculty to be placated by his stand and the alliance between faculty, administration, and Regents to be maintained. However, the violence resulting from the administration's hard-line position was far greater than any part of the university expected; more than fifty protestors and several policemen were injured. Shock and outrage were the dominant reactions on the part of both those who favored the use of force and those who opposed it. In the emergency faculty meeting that followed the protest, the issue of the university's complicity with the federal government's Vietnam policy was



obscured by the issue of student brutality compared to police brutality; the issue was transformed into a debate over the basis of internal university governance. Although the majority of the faculty favored the use of force rather than attempts at change, the narrow margin—less than fifty votes out of more than a thousand cast—by which a vote of confidence in the administration was passed gave evidence of serious division within the faculty. Correspondingly, the three-day demonstration held by a significant portion of the student body to protest the treatment of their fellows confirmed expectations of polarization between university authorities and students.

The demonstration also had repercussions in state politics. On the night of the crisis, the Republican-dominated state assembly, then in session, passed a resolution by a vote of ninety-four to five which demanded that the Regents "reevaluate administrative policies of excessive permissiveness in handling student demonstrators." Many other antiuniversity bills were introduced in the following weeks and while only a few passed, the lesson to university administrators, and particularly to the Board of Regents, was clear.

Sewell's handling of the 1967 Dow demonstration was the logical outcome of administration policy. Sewell carried out what he correctly perceived to be the wishes of the dominant forces in university government. This action resulted in a polarization of the university community which called into question both the role of the university in society and the internal mode of governance of the university. The erosion of the university's claim to legitimate authority had begun. After trying unsuccessfully to reconcile the various elements of the university community during the remainder of the 1967–1968 academic year, Sewell admitted failure and resigned. The chancellor had been identified by the community as a partisan official whose primary task was the control of unruly students and dissident faculty. Because Sewell's action during the Dow crisis had so defined the chancellor's role, the next occupant of the office was necessarily a man who would support those elements within the university power structure who demanded maintenance of the existing system of governance and of "law and order"—a large portion of the faculty, the regents, and the legislature.

H. Edwin Young assumed the chancellorship in September, 1968. The next major crisis on the Madison campus came in February, 1969, over the issues raised by the Thirteen Black Demands and corresponded to the national wave of demonstrations related to black studies that year. Following the annual week-long Wisconsin Student Association symposium, devoted to the race question, black students submitted a list of thirteen demands to the university administration. Essentially, they

asked for the creation of an Afro-American studies department mainly under student control, the establishment of a black cultural center, the admission of fifteen black students expelled several months earlier from Oshkosh State University, and a substantial increase in the number of black students at the university.<sup>21</sup> (There are only about eight hundred black students on the Madison campus.)

With the support of white radical student groups, the black students called a strike and engaged in militant demonstrations. Initially, the strike did not generate widespread support, so the strikers moved to forcibly prevent students from entering classroom buildings. The administration responded by calling city police to keep academic buildings open. The calling of police had the same effect at the University of Wisconsin as it did at many other universities: The strike won substantially more support. Because of continued disruptions and sporadic acts of vandalism by students, the National Guard was called in on the morning of February 13, 1969. With the National Guard on campus, student support for the strike escalated, and most classes in the College of Letters and Sciences were effectively halted. After a few more days of sporadic demonstrations, some vandalism, and virtual occupation of the university by troops and police, student support for the strike waned, and it was eventually called off by the organizers.

The tactics employed by student demonstrators were indicative of their response to the administration's ready resort to force. Instead of offering themselves as immobile targets for police, the students engaged in hit and run tactics. The police, confronted by agitators indistinguishable from and often hidden by the majority of students, resorted to indiscriminate violence which outraged observers and often provided the catalyst which turned them into demonstrators. The shift from stationary confrontation to guerilla tactics resulted in more severe disruption of the campus and of the surrounding business area and student "ghetto." When the police proved incapable of controlling the situation, Young did not hesitate to call in the National Guard. But increased force only caused more members of the university community to take a stand against the use of outside agents of social control. In the long run, the Black Demands protest confirmed the alienation of the student body from the administration and faculty, heightened divisions within the faculty, and legitimated violence as a means of conflict resolution by introducing outside agents of social control into the initial stages of conflict and by bolstering those forces with the presence of the National Guard.

The immediate results of the Black Demands strike more or less paralleled the aftermath of the Dow demonstrations the previous year. The faculty met in an emergency meeting and, after heated discussion,

voted to support the administration's position of not negotiating on or giving in to any of the demands. At the same time, several committees were established to examine the question of a black studies department and related issues. On the initiative of the Regents, several student leaders were suspended or expelled, and a formal investigation of the university was undertaken by the legislature. The student movement, so powerful during the crisis, all but disappeared, and the cooperation between white and black militants, based on white support for the demands and the tactics of the blacks, came to an end.

This crisis, however, produced greater change than the Dow demonstration did, perhaps because minority group protest seemed more legitimate to the university community than did antiwar demonstrations. An Afro-American studies department was established in the College of Letters and Sciences about a year later, and an Afro-American center opened on campus within a semester after the crisis. While the department's structure did not satisfy the demands of the black students for control, it did constitute a substantial university response to the challenge, partly because of the support of Dean Leon Epstein of the College of Letters and Sciences. Although there was some opposition to the concept of a black studies department from conservative faculty, the compromise departmental structure which finally emerged met with no major opposition.

In the spring of 1969, a three-day confrontation between police and students took place in the off-campus student community, the Mifflin Street area. City authorities denied a student request for permission to have a block party. They held the party anyway, and the city police were called in to break it up. Although the Mifflin Street riots were mostly off campus and did not involve confrontation between students and the university, the classic town and gown aspect of the battle identified the immediate community of Madison as being as hostile to and as repressive toward students as were the university authorities. Thus, the difference between city and university administrations was diminished by the use of violence as a means of social control. Through repeated use, violence came to be regarded by both the authorities and the dissident young as a legitimate means of conflict resolution. Furthermore, the use of force by those in positions of authority gave increasing credibility to the militant argument that violence was the only tactic understood by the establishment. Thus, during the 1969-1970 academic year, student protestors and street people came to regard both university and city as representative of an intransigent social order and both were attacked as such in the "trash-ing" that more and more frequently marked the climax of a demonstration. The student body as a whole, made familiar with violence over a

period of years, reacted to this violence with silence. If they did not support it, neither did they condemn it. Violence had become acceptable.

The major campus crisis over the Cambodian invasion in the spring of 1970 was national in scope although it also had some specific local ingredients. The national agitation over Cambodia and Kent State, occurring when the Madison campus was already highly politicized by the recent TAA strike, swiftly and effectively brought academic life to a halt for the rest of the semester. The events on campus followed a familiar pattern, although the intensity was greater than in the past and the numbers of students (and National Guard troops) involved was greater. Another key difference was that, in addition to the Teaching Assistants Association, a large number of the faculty were mobilized in general sympathy with the students. For the first time in a number of years, the isolation of liberal elements of the faculty from the student movement was broken, if only for a short time.

The scenario of protest was similar to that of earlier incidents described above. A student strike, followed by militant demonstrations, some property damage and trashing in the local business area, led to the calling of the National Guard by university officials who otherwise did not speak publicly on the crisis. Classes in many parts of the university, and especially in the College of Letters and Sciences, were cancelled for almost a week. Several schools, including law and nursing, suspended classes for varying periods of time, and, perhaps with the exception of the engineering and agriculture campuses, the university did not function normally for well over a week. Indeed, the combination of the TAA strike and the Cambodia and Kent State crisis meant that the final six weeks of the spring semester of 1970 saw a major disruption of the academic program of the university, although Wisconsin did not officially close nor, with the exception of some revisions in grading patterns, officially change its schedule because of the crisis.

Yet no one was killed. Perhaps death was avoided during the confrontation because both students and police were so familiar with confrontation as a mode of conflict resolution that they had evolved an informal set of rules which marked the limits of acceptable violence, and neither group broke those rules. Despite its intensity, confrontation had taken on a highly ritualized pattern. Students usually engaged police by threatening a war-related facility—for example, the ROTC building or the AMRC—and police responded by dispersing students with gas and physical charges. The student demonstrators were quite aware that they would never reach their stated objective; indeed, it is difficult to imagine what they would have done if they had been allowed to do so—confronting an empty building is hardly as dramatic as waging mock guerilla war-



fare with the police. The real intent of the students was to so disrupt the university by their struggle with its agents of social control that business as usual would be impossible and the university effectively shut down. Concomitantly, the police made few serious attempts to deal with the mass of students after their initial dispersal. A limit to violence was maintained as long as each group remained in a solid body, and confined its behavior to the ritual pattern of threat and counter-threat. Within these limits, injury to person and property could and did occur on both sides, but death was avoided.

The faculty response to the situation was significant. Close to 300 professors—out of a total faculty of 2,300—signed a statement opposing the United States government's actions, calling for the university to close, and indicating that they would not conduct business as usual during the crisis. Although not quite a strike statement, this was the most radical response taken by Wisconsin faculty members during the various crises. Indeed, the faculty, meeting as a committee of the whole shortly after the signing of the statement, voted to close down the university, thus indicating the depth of their feeling. About 1,200 faculty members attended the meeting, and the resolution passed by a large majority. The university administration, however, did not follow the wishes of the faculty majority, kept the university open, and refused to convene another faculty meeting until the crisis was over and the end of the semester was at hand. The administration, no doubt, breathed a sigh of relief that the legislature was not in session at the time and thus no dramatic outcry was heard and no investigation launched.

As did the other cases discussed here, the Cambodia and Kent State crisis had some lasting impact. For one thing, the Board of Regents after threatening to tighten up discipline for some time, finally set up new procedures to mete out swift justice to student offenders and by-pass the slow processes of the previous faculty-run discipline system. It is significant that the state attorney general was instrumental in devising these new procedures, thus indicating the increased interest of the state government in university affairs. This "incursion" of the Regents into what has traditionally been a function of the faculty is but one example of the increasingly activist role of the Regents.

Many faculty members, particularly younger and more liberal ones, were deeply disillusioned by the crisis and by the response of the university to it. Wisconsin, with its strong tradition of faculty self-government, had long counted on the ethos of faculty power to keep excellent professors in Madison when other institutions offered higher salaries and better conditions. Thus, the tradition of faculty control and perhaps the stability of the faculty were dealt a blow by Regent actions. The student reaction is

more difficult to gauge, but it is at least possible that the atmosphere which was created by the whole experience of the Cambodia and Kent State crisis made the bombing of the Army Mathematics Research Center, which occurred only a few months later, acceptable to many non-revolutionary students.

The bombing of the Army Mathematics Research Center not only was one of the most dramatic events at Wisconsin, it had implications for the campus and perhaps for the country at large. While it is fairly clear that the actual bombing was not connected to the radical movement on campus, two of the four individuals who allegedly participated in the event were University of Wisconsin students and former members of the staff of the *Daily Cardinal*, the student newspaper. The reaction of politically minded students on campus was generally mixed, revealing deep sorrow at the loss of life but at the same time showing satisfaction that one of the key issues of the student left, the continued existence of the AMRC, was "solved" by the bombing. (Of course, the question was not in reality solved, since the AMRC simply moved to other quarters and continued to function.) The general campus reaction of shock and helplessness has not yet disappeared.

The bombing threw the radical movement into tactical disarray. Activists found it difficult to deal with the bombing even in terms of "revolutionary" strategy, while the large majority of students, including many sympathetic to the movement, were outraged by the event. Many within the student left disagreed with the action on both tactical and moral grounds. As of this writing, the campus left has not recovered—there have been no successful mass demonstrations and the active political groups do not seem to be functioning effectively. There is no question but that the bombing contributed to the political inactivity of the 1970–1971 academic year on the Madison campus, and perhaps nationally, because of the demoralization and tactical confusion it caused. Many students felt that the bombing was the logical outcome of the confrontation politics of the sixties. Yet the bombing was morally unjustifiable and politically ineffective. Many students withdrew from the movement because of the lack of a clear direction.

Faculty, administration, and Regent response was predictable. The faculty was both outraged and demoralized. There was little they could do to prevent another bombing. Faculty opposition to student radicals, already strong, probably increased. The administration and the Regents merely increased their tendency toward a "law and order" posture in the face of campus problems. For the first time, city police were brought on campus to patrol on a regular basis, and contingency plans for various kinds of disruptions were made.



The University of Wisconsin has obviously been subject to the very serious pressures facing American higher education generally in the sixties. Despite this fact, it is clear that the university has not truly responded to many of the challenges which face it. The symptoms of failure are evident: A faculty senate was organized in 1969-1970 with neither the consultation nor the participation of students, although at other universities, such as Columbia, students were involved in similar changes in governance. Despite a great deal of deliberation and some conflict, no basic reforms in the curriculum have been made, and the administrative structure has remained unaltered, although there are some indications that this situation may be changing. The university has not been able to move far or fast enough to meet demands on it from undergraduate or graduate students, from teaching assistants, or occasionally from junior faculty. While it is very likely that some student demands should be rejected, the University of Wisconsin has met almost none regardless of merit.

Those in charge of the University of Wisconsin—the Regents and the senior faculty and administrators—are certainly not evil men. They are not even, for the most part, incompetent. They are simply locked into an academic system which was formed over a period of almost fifty years and which was solidified during the boom period of the fifties. This system has served the interests of the senior faculty quite well and has permitted the University of Wisconsin to grow and to maintain if not expand its national prestige. But this situation has changed, and it is clear that neither the increasingly radical and dissatisfied students nor the financially troubled state government will continue to support the traditional means of academic governance and orientation of the university.

The political future of the university is unclear. In February of 1971, Governor Lucey, in his budget message to the legislature, called for an amalgamation of the University of Wisconsin system and the Wisconsin State University system under one Board of Regents. Such a shift, which the governor claims will save four million dollars in administrative costs, would have major implications for the Madison campus if implemented and could possibly mean financial disaster. The availability of funds under the new Democratic administration in the state is also unclear, and the prospects seem very dim indeed. Thus, the University of Wisconsin enters the 1970s without direction and in a state of substantial crisis. Budgetary crises have forced administrators to spend much of their time belt tightening while students demand that more attention be given to undergraduate instruction and other expensive proposals. What is more, the will to adapt to what are clearly new situations does not seem to be dramatically evident.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Portions of this chapter also appear in P. G. Altbach, "The Champagne University in the Beer State: Notes on the Crisis at Wisconsin," in David Riesman (ed.), *Case Studies of Universities in Crisis* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972). We are indebted to Matt Pommer, Durward Long, David Riesman, and Verne A. Stadtman for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

<sup>2</sup> C. Kerr, *The Uses of the University* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1966), pp. 1, 20.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Chapter Two.

<sup>4</sup> For a discussion of the history of student activism at the University of Wisconsin, see Chapter Seventeen. The best overall discussion of the history of the University of Wisconsin is M. Curti and V. Carstenson, *The University of Wisconsin: A History, 1848-1925* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1949), 2 vol.

<sup>5</sup> See M. Mankoff, *The Political Socialization of Student Radicals and Militants in the Wisconsin Student Movement during the 1960's*, unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1970.

<sup>6</sup> M. Lyons, *Campus Reactions to Student Protest*, unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1971, p. 49.

<sup>7</sup> See Chapter Fourteen.

<sup>8</sup> The history and ideology of the TAA are discussed in Chapter Fifteen.

<sup>9</sup> *Report of the Committee on the Teaching Assistant System* (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1968), p. 21.

<sup>10</sup> See Mankoff for an elaboration of this point. See also M. Mankoff and R. Flacks, "The Changing Social Base of the American Student Movement," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 1971, 395, 54-67.

<sup>11</sup> *Faculty Participation in Academic Governance: Report of the AAHE-NEA Task Force on Faculty Representation and Academic Negotiations, Campus Governance Programs* (Washington, D.C.: American Association for Higher Education, 1970).

<sup>12</sup> R. Hofstadter, *Anti-Intellectualism in American Life* (New York: Knopf, 1963), pp. 199-204.

<sup>13</sup> In this respect, the University of Wisconsin conforms to the paradigm developed by A. W. Gouldner in "Cosmopolitans and Locals: Toward an Analysis of Latent Social Roles, I and II," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 1957-58, 2, 281-306, 444-480.

<sup>14</sup> S. M. Lipset, "The Politics of Academia," in D. C. Nichols (Ed.), *Perspectives on Campus Tensions* (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1970), pp. 85-118.

<sup>15</sup> See P. L. Dressel, F. C. Johnson, and P. M. Marcus, *The Confidence Crisis: An Analysis of University Departments* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1970), for a more detailed discussion of the nature and functions of academic departments in large universities.

<sup>16</sup> The problems of academic administrators are dealt with in Chapters One, Two, and Three.

<sup>17</sup> There is very little written about or by the University of Wisconsin Board of Regents. For two commentaries, from rather different perspectives, see A. DeBardeleben, "The University's External Constituency," in W. Metzger and others, *Dimensions of Academic Freedom* (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1969), pp. 69-91, and C. Gelatt, *The Regents: Rulers or Rubber Stamps?* (Madison: Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin, 1969).

<sup>18</sup> The Wisconsin situation conforms generally to the national characteristics of members of academic governing boards which were reported in R. Hartnett, *The New College Trustees: Some Predictions for the 1970s* (Princeton, N.J.: Educational Testing Service, 1970).

<sup>19</sup> See M. Pommer, "Regent Rule at Wisconsin," *Change*, 1970, 2, 27-28.

<sup>20</sup> For a more detailed discussion of the Dow crisis, see D. Long, "Wisconsin: Changing Styles of Administrative Response," in J. Foster and D. Long (Eds.), *Protest!* (New York: Morrow, 1970), pp. 246-270. See also Chapters Seven and Ten of this book.

<sup>21</sup> For a more detailed discussion of the black demands crisis, see Chapter Sixteen.



## PART ONE



## THE POWER STRUCTURE



It is becoming increasingly clear at the University of Wisconsin, and indeed at other universities, that the role of faculty in the governance of the institution is diminishing at a rapid rate. The faculty has a role, although, as Donald McCarty points out, it is not always a constructive one. This part, then, excludes the faculty from among the elements in the university power structure but includes a mixed bag of other groups and interests. Our intention is to fo-